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REFLECTIONS ON MARKET
REFORM IN POST-WAR, POSTEMBARGO VIETNAM
LANCAo•

I. INTRODUCTION

Vietnam's long war ended on April 30, 1975, more than twentyfive years ago. I was one of the lucky ones who was able to leave, and
along with hundreds of thousands of others, made my new life in the
United States, all the while with my eyes glued to the events in
Vietnam. In Midnight's Children, Salman Rushdie told the story of a
boy, Saleem, born on the stroke of midnight on the day India declared
independence from the British. 1 By virtue of that coincidence, Saleem
was bestowed-along with 1,001 other children born in the first hour
of India's Independence, between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on August
14, 1947-with telepathic powers. 2 Midnight's Children is about the
interweaving of myth, magic, and history in the little boy's life, a
mythical refiguration, a surrealistic mirror in ·other words, of India
itself, with all the cracks, fissures, dashed hopes, and unrealized

* Lan Cao is Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, MarshallWythe School of Law. Professor Cao graduated magna cum laude, phi beta kappa
from Mount Holyoke College and Yale law School, where she was an Editor of the
Yale Law Journal. Professor Cao has published widely on a range of topics, such as
privatization in transitional economies, globalization, U.S. trade laws, law and
economics, and economic development. Her recent publications include Chinese
Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 L. & Contemporary Problems 13 (2000)
and Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 841 (1999). In
1996, upon invitation from the Ministry of Education, Professor Cao delivered a series
oflectures on international business law at the University of Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi.
1. Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1989).
2. !d.

1029

1030

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

aspirations that accompanied post-independence construction. 3 As
Saleem remarked self-importantly, "Thanks to the occult tyrannies of
those blandly saluting clocks I had been mysteriously handcuffed to
history, my destinies indissolubly chained to those of my country."4
To a certain degree, though on a much less hallucinatory or
fantastic scale, the personal lives of many Vietnamese overseas in
America remain tied, in one way or another, to the collective history of
the country we left behind. Whether we like or dislike the new regime,
even if we have severed ourselves from the government, the umbilical
cord connecting us to the country remains strong. And so, it was with
great emotional and political interest that we watched as Vietnam
embarked first on a policy that walled the country off from the global
economy, and then in recent years, a policy that has shifted the
country's course away from separation, toward international
integration.
The so-called "new" 5 law and development movement, with its
emphasis on market economics, 6 is currently experiencing a
resurgence, as interest in development shifts from one that relies on a
declaration of a "right to development," and other rights under United
Nations' auspices, to one that relies on market-based reforms. 7 This
essay briefly chronicles Vietnam's postwar years, its policy of isolation
instituted after April 30, 1975, and its subsequent shift toward
incremental reintegration with the global economy. After five years of
negotiations, Vietnam has entered into a comprehensive bilateral trade
accord with the United States, another step toward greater integration.
With its new emwhasis on more openness, more communication, and
more connection, what else must Vietnam do to ensure that openness
3. Jd.
4. Id. at 11.
5. "New," presumably, to distinguish itself from the out-of-style sociologydominated law and development movement of the 1960s.
6. See generally Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law,
16 Inti. Rev. L. & Econ. 141, 142 (June 1996).
7. See e.g. Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic
Development, 32 Tex. Inti. L.J. 209, 266 (1997) (discussing efforts to move the
economic development debate from the market norms of the GATT/WTO to the norms
of the UN, through the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights; the declarations to a new international economic order; and a "right to
development" in order "to create a more sweeping affirmative ethos deemed more
conducive to the economic needs of the developing world").
8. Investors Cautiously Applaud Vietnam Phone Rate Slash, Deutsche Presse-
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becomes a reality and to facilitate its transition from a closed; centrally
planned economy to a more diverse market-based one? More
specifically, which policies, given the structural and political
constraints posed by Communist Party (Party) rule, will best facilitate
its efforts at legal reforms to further its objective of economic
integration and its self-professed commitment to the "rule of law"? 9
This essay will situate these questions within the specific context of
Vietnam's historical experiences with the Chinese, French, and Soviet
legal systems.
I have, however," no grand conclusions to offer, partly because the
observations in this essay are somewhat impressionistic, drawn from
my personal experience and intuition, and partly because Vietnam itself
has no comprehensive or grand conclusion either. One often hears that
Vietnam and other countries such as China, and a few Eastern
European countries, are not only "developing" but also "transitional"that is, countries still no.t fully formed, not "quite there" yet, but on
their way toward a place already predestined, probably very much like
the place arrived at by Western industrialized countries. But as the
writer Jorge Luis Borges remarked, "time forks, perpetually, into
countless futures." 10
My observations are limited to which future, among the
innumerable ones facing postwar, post-embargo Vietnam, that Vietnam
must not embrace. That it must abandon a command and control
economy is clear, with its built-in ideological notion that the
government is empowered to preempt all allocations except those
planned, ordered, and administered by it. A system in which the
government decides who is to enter into what kind of exchanges with
whom, and in which quantities and for what purpose, does not have
much to say in terms of allowing, much less furthering, individual
rights and freedom.

Agentur (Sept. 22, 2000). As the deputy administration manager of the Directorate
General of Posts and Telecommunications announced this year, "We want to facilitate
Vietnam's process of integration into the global community and we want foreign
investors to understand they are welcome in Vietnam." Id.
9. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 ( 1997) (discussing the varying interpretations of the
"rule of law."). "The Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historic ideal, the precise
meaning of which may be less clear today than ever before." Id.
10. Jorge Luis Borges, The Garden of Forking Paths, in Collected Fictions: Jorge
Luis Borges 127 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking Press 1998).

1032

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

Vietnam is currently engaged in legal reform, or as the process
has been popularly termed, the construction of a "rule of law." This is
a term with problematic overtones. One could object that what the
Western law-and-development advisers aim to introduce in a rule-oflaw project is a cultural export that seeks to impose Western standards
and understanding onto other societies. But an even more basic, firstorder objection should be noted. The term "rule of law," and not just
its content, whatever that may be, is value-laden. It assumes that
certain societies that do not have the characteristics of a "rule of law"
are characterized by anarchy and lawlessness, disorder and chaos, and
must therefore be "remade," their culture re-invented from the outside
in, from the top down. For example, is a society whose members are
guided by, and comply with, traditional norms of behavior, 11 a society
that is devoid of law? Should community reliance on traditional
dispute resolution, such as informal mediation that emphasizes
conciliation under the guidance of a community elder (usually male) be
replaced by more institutionalized mechanisms consisting of courts and
lawyers engaged in formal litigation? Are norms that exist outside the
state-supported edifice of codes and rules less "law-like" than formal
law? Indeed, scholars of the United States in recent years have studied
the operation of informal community norms in a variety of settings and
have suggested that such norms act not only as a guide for behavior,
but also provide their own sets of enforcement and sanctions against
breach. It is thus paradoxical that the law and development "rule of
law" projects pay so little attention to the norms or private law of
countries at issue, or more specifically, to the interaction between
private law and state law in such countries-even while their
counterparts in other fields of law are devoting time and intellectual
energy to this very concept.
This criticism, however, is not intended to be an argument against
legal reform as such, but merely against legal reform undertaken with
the presumption that whatever system certain countries have, that
regime does not qualify as law. It might very well be that pre-reform
sets of rules, norms, standards, even formal laws, are not conducive to
the establishment of a certain type of society or a certain mode of

II. That is, "informal" community or "private law"-rather than by the rules of
"formal," state law enacted by the legislature. See generally Lan Cao, Looking at
Communities and Markets, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 841 (1999).
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economic system. This does not necessarily mean, however, that such
a pre-reform regime is a Hobbesian one without a "rule oflaw."
The Vietnamese government, for example, has embarked on a
path of "market socialism"-a market-based economy within the
perimeters of government-controlled socialism. In this respect, it is
appropriate and necessary to ask what type of law is required to support
a market economy generally, and a market economy in a globalized
system particularly. Does the current regime of laws, formal or
informal, promote market exchanges? The government has proclaimed
that it is putting into place a "rule of law." However, it seems that the
Vietnamese government currently confuses the enactment of laws with
the establishment of a "rule of law." "Rule of law," at least in the
context of a modem, open-market system of economic exchanges, is
something altogether different from "rule by law"-that is, the
institution of multiple laws, decrees, and circulars that together add up
to legislation overload, increased bureaucratization, and the very
opposite of transparency, impartiality, and predictability-the basic
principles necessary for a "rule of law" in a market economy. "Rule by
law," in other words, means the state continues to rule by the use of
"law" rather than by party fiat. "Rule of law," by contrast, implies a
situation where the government's rule is itself constrained by the limits
of law. A market economy, especially one that seeks integration with
the global economic system, needs to ensure that its economic laws are
transparent, impartial, and predictable. The obvious conclusion then, is
this: The "rule of law" project for a country that seeks to establish a
market economy is one that will put in place the values of
transparency, impartiality, and predictability.

II. "DAY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" AND YEARS OF POSTWAR
ISOLATION: ANTI-MARKET, ANTI-CAPITAL, ANTI-INTEGRATION

In the Little Saigons scattered across the United States, April 30

is remembered as the Day ofNational Mourning. In Vietnam, April30
is officially designated the Day of National Liberation.
For years since the war's end, Vietnam, under the control of the
Party, has adopted a policy of national liberation-"liberation" of the
market from individual bourgeois preferences and "liberation" of the
national economy from the international economic system. Vietnam
adopted economic policies that were aimed. at ensuring Party control of
the domestic market, while severing the domestic market from the
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international market. When North Vietnam declared independence
from the French in 1945, it adopted a central plan to ensure Party
control of the market for the pursuit of economic policies that the Party
favored. To the extent that a free market of voluntary exchanges
reflects individual preferences, the Party took steps essentially to
strangle the market and force it to reflect Party-imposed plans and
preferences 12 in accordance with the Marxist view that markets are
neither fixed nor natural, but contingent on, and a reflection of, social
and hegemonic constructs. Hegemony-originally a Greek term used
to designate the power of a state over other states, Athens over the
other Greek states for example, or as it later came to be understood, the
power of Prussia over the German states 13-was later extended to
include a system of domination that relies not on brute force, but on
control by more subtle or seemingly consensual means. 14 Building on

12. Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold
War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 L. & Socy. Rev. 93, 98 (1998). According to a
Vietnamese scholar, the Party's rule by decree ensured that individual preferences,
whether as reflected in the economic sphere, or some other sphere, would be
subordinated to the State's preferences.
Everything was prearranged by the State, while personal interests had to
entirely submit to the interests of the State and the collective. Thus, there
was only one option left for social relations: to obey the administrative orders
issued from above and at all levels. In such a situation even a semblance of
legality became superfluous or just a formality.
Id. (citation omitted).
13. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 105 (2d ed. 1989).
Besides Gramsci's
reformulation of the term "hegemony," it is also used in international relations to
suggest the condition of control by one state over another, through force, culture, and
economics. See generally William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization,
US Intervention, and Hegemony 21 (Cambridge U. Press 1996).
14. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971) [hereinafter Prison
Notebooks]. Gramsci explained the concept of hegemony as a condition in which the
supremacy of a social group is maintained not by physical force or command, but by
the submission of the very group dominated. Control must be maintained with "force
and ... consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation." Jd. at 180. The
first type of control may be achieved through state action, the police, the army, and the
courts. The second, more insidious, type may be achieved through the co-opting of
dissent, the dissemination and perpetuation of the dominant beliefs as universal and
natural and neutral-internalized and accepted by a range of institutions such as
schools, churches, museums, and culture. Domination therefore is often achieved not
through constant force, but through subtle and often consensual means. Id.
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Marx's idea of a base and superstructure, 15 in which Marx espoused a
deterministic causality from the base, defined as the relations of
economic production, to the superstructure, consisting of law, morality,
and ideology, Marxists, such as Gramsci, introduced the idea of the
"historical bloc"-consisting of "structures and superstructures." 16
Thus, "[s]tructures and superstructures form a 'historical bloc.' That is
to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the
superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations
of production." 17 The idea of a historical bloc, which draws in other
institutions neglected by Marx, such as art, education, and religion, but
which also captures the degree to which the dominant order is reflected
in and reproduces itself at multiple levels, does not mean that the
economic sphere-the market-is not central. "For though hegemony
is ethical-political, it must also be economic." 18 If the market is a
reflection of politics, then it should be politically controlled. 19 The
15. Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in
The Marx-Engels Reader 3 (Robert C. Tuckered., 2d ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1978).
16. Prison Notebooks, supra n. 14, at 377.
17. Jd. at 366; see Giuseppe Fiori, Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary 238
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1971)
Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lay ... in his argument that the system's
real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive
power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a
conception of the world which belongs to the rulers. The philosophy of the
ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to
emerge as common sense: that is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept
the morality, the customs, the institutionalized rules of behavior of the
society they live in.
Id.
18. Prison Notebooks, supra n. 14, at 161.
19. The Marxist critique of the market is based to a large degree on the notion that
the market is by no means free nor reflective of individual preference, but rather a
reflection of a hegemonic social order and vice versa. However, by no means is the
critique of the market as a social construct solely a Marxist critique-communitarians
and others have also questioned the claim of market advocates that the market is nonjudgmental because it merely reflects individual preferences. See e.g. Mark Sagoff,
Should Preferences Count?, 70 Land Econ. 127 (1994) ("Markets create desires ... as
quickly as they satisfy them; that is why there are salespeople. Markets, then, may be
inefficient in the sense that the preferences they satisfy tend to be endogenous to
them."). "As Sagoff suggest[ed], it cannot be argued that the satisfaction of
preferences is a good thing in itself, for many preferences are sadistic, envious, racist,
or unjust." Jane B. Baron & Jefferey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral
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state therefore, in its construction of a socialistic society, should not
favor individual or market-based preferences, but should seek
affirmatively to inculcate socialist virtues, even if it means acting to
circumvent the market or individual preferences as reflected in market
transactions.
Like other countries that had liberated themselves from colonial
domination, such as India under Gandhi and Nehru, Tanzania under
Nyerere, or Egypt under Nasser, North Vietnam exhibited a profound
distrust of market and market norms, and generally equated the market
with foreign domination, colonialism, and imperialism, so that national
liberation and anti-colonialism meant the imposition of anti-market,
anti-capital economic policies in the name of nationalism. European
capital accumulation, as Marx noted, was accomplished during the
colonial times when "the treasures captured outside Europe by
undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the
mother-country and transformed themselves into capital." 20 Given this
history, for the developing world, foreign investment by capitalists
from the developed world was viewed as a form of neocolonialism
because it subjects the national economy to foreign control by, and
dependency on, foreign capitalists in the developed world.
The dependency theory of development has generally meant the
adoption of policies designed to extricate the national economy from
the international economy, 21 and to put an end to dependent
development, that is Third World development dictated by the needs of
the rich First World. As a result, economic development meant state
control and administration of the national economy in a way that would
reflect the preferences and developmental objectives of the state, and
concomitantly, withdrawal of the national economy from the
international. Trade barriers were instituted to keep out foreign goods
and foreign capital and subsidies were bestowed on domestic industry.
To accomplish this objective, Vietnam, through the Party, promptly
brought the means of production under unitary state control after its
declaration of independence. Lands belonging to "reactionary"

Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 431, 439 (1996)
(citing Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 Ethics 30 I, 302 (1986)).
20. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 823, 826 (Frederick
Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Modem Lib. 1936).
21. See generally Richard Grabowski & Michael P. Shields, Development
Economics I 0 (Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1996).
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landlords and the French were nationalized,22 and agriculture and
industry were placed under state and collective ownership,23 most
through administrative decree. 24 Similarly, pursuant to its policy
favoring delinkage from the international economic system and
economic self-reliance, the Party, following the victory of North
Vietnam in 1975, extended the central plan already in place in the
North over the entire country and collectivized agriculture in the
former South Vietnam.
Economic production in Vietnam stagnated in the late 1970s and
the 1980s.25 The post-war economy suffered from hyperinflation, as
annual rates exceeded 100 percent and reached 400 percent in 1985 and
1986.26 Vietnam's standard of living declined precipitously, dropping
to among the lowest in the world, with a gross national product per
capita of$200. 27 An aunt who remained in Saigon, and whom I visited
in 1996, told me about a morning in early 1975 when she walked
downstairs to find a couple of young North Vietnamese men in her
ki~chen, trying to make sense of the kitchen appliances.
To her
astonishment, they were trying to make coffee and had apparently
mistaken her bra for a coffee filter. These were the same men who
would be assigned to run her business, a small factory manufacturing
"tiger balm" ointments that the government promptly confiscated. The

22. See John Gillespie, Land Law Subsystems? Urban Vietnam as a Case Study, 7
P. Rim L. & Policy J. 555, 566-67 (1998). "The Land Reform Law of 1953 ... [and
subsequent implementing decrees] ... divided the ... population along class-lines into
landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and the
urban proletariat." /d.
23. John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative
Analysis, 30 Stanford J. Inti. L. 325, 331 (1994).
24. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 97 n. 10. Of the 1,747 legal documents passed
between 1945 and 1954 in the North, only one was a formal law-the 1953 Land
Reform Law. /d. The rest consisted of 621 presidential orders, 656 government
decrees, and 413 ministry circulars. /d. In 1961, the Ministry of Justice was
dismantled, and the Party, which ruled by decree, not legislation, controlled the
executive bodies of the government. /d. at 97.
25. See generally Adam Fforde & Suzanne H. Paine, The Limits of National
Liberation: Problems of Economic Management in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (Croom Helm 1987); Dang T. Tran, Vietnam: Socialist Economic
Development, 1955-1992 (ICS Press 1994).
26. See Inst. S.E. Asian Stud., Vietnam's Dilemmas and Options: The Challenge of
Economic Transition in the 1990s 4-5 (Mya Than & Joseph L.H. Tan eds., Inst. S.E.
Asian Stud. 1993).
27. 1d. at 31.
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two had been buffalo herders before being assigned the job of factory
manager.
In response to Vietnam's human ri~hts abuses, 28 and the apparent
lack of progress in the POW/MIA issue, 9 the United States reinforced
Vietnam's segregation from the rest of the world by imposing an
economic embargo on Vietnam throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 30
Economic contact with Vietnam was prohibited, including such
commercial activities as ex~ort to Vietnam of all but the most basic
humanitarian commodities, 1 import of all Vietnamese commodities
into the United States, 32 the movement of U.S. ships and planes to
Vietnam, 33 and the transportation of goods to Vietnam in U.S. planes
and ships. 34
In 1986, Vietnam dramatically shifted course. Faced with
economic decline and dwindling Soviet support, the Sixth Communist
Party Congress announced that Vietnam, like China almost a decade
earlier, would transform its centralized command and control economy
into a market-based system open to foreign investment. 35 This pivotal
shift, called doi moi, meaning "new day" or "renovation," was
undertaken, among other purposes, to dismantle the collective farming

28. See generally Brad Parker, Vietnam and Perspectives on Development
Assistance and Human Rights <http://members.aol.com/_ht_a/fanta07/myhomepage/
artgallery.html> (accessed Apr. 4, 2001).
29. See generally Sen. Exec. Rpt. 103-1 (Jan. 26, 1993) (reprinted in 139 Cong.
Rec. 8688-06 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1993)) (available in 1993 WL 14760) (POW/MIA
Affairs); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, amend. nos. 1847,
1848 (reprinted in 140 Cong. Rec. 87587-88 (1994)) (available in 1994 WL 279514).
30. See generally Frederick Z. Brown, President Clinton's Visit to Vietnam
<http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/clintoninvietnam.html> (accessed Apr. 2,
2001). In 1977, the Carter administration made overtures to normalize relations with
Vietnam, whereby the U.S. would establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam, lift the
embargo, and support international financial loans to Vietnam, as well as grant
Vietnam most favored nation status. /d. Vietnam, however, demanded that the U.S.
honor President Nixon's promise, under the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, of$3.25 billion
in economic assistance before it would accept the U.S. offer of normalization. /d. The
U.S. responded with the claim that Hanoi's violations of the Paris Peace Accords
nullified any obligation of economic assistance. !d.
31. 15 C.F.R~ § 785.1 (1994) (amended at 59 Fed. Reg. 6524-25 (Feb. 10, 1994)).
32. 31 C.P.R.§ 500.204 (1994).
33. 44 C.P.R.§ 403.1 (1993) (revised at 59 Fed. Reg. 8412-01 (Feb. 22, 1994)).
34. /d. at § 403.2.
35. Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 325 n. 1. The official policy was announced at the 8th
Plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam, June 10-17, 1986. !d.
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system, introduce a private sector, and encourage direct foreign
investment. 36 Pursuant to the initial 1986 doi moi policy, the state
retained its dominant role as economic planner while also taking steps
to deregulate prices. Subsequently, the Party limited state ownership to
key industries but liberalized the rest of the economy by allowing
mixed state and private ownership, including foreign ownership. 37 Doi
moi marked the beginning of the country's transformation-from a
command economy under absolute Party control, insulated from the
global economy, to a mixed market, on the way to re-integrating with
the global economy.
On February 3, 1994, President Clinton lifted the U.S. economic
embargo on Vietnam, 38 marking the beginning of a series of steps
taken to normalize relations between the United States and Vietnam.
Since 1994, the United States has established an ambassadorial level
diplomatic relationship with Vietnam, allowed the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the U.S. Export Import Bank to support
U.S. exports to or operations in Vietnam, and granted a waiver from
the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 39 Pending congressional approval is
the comprehensive bilateral trade accord between the United States and
Vietnam, 40 which is yet an additional step in Vietnam's efforts in
recent years to liberalize the market, reverse its inward-looking policy
in favor of a more outward-looking one that favors integration into the

36. See generally Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam with Amendments and
Additions, 30 I.L.M. 930 (1991) [hereinafter Law on Foreign Investment]. On
December 29, 1987, the Eighth National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam at its second session passed the Law on Foreign Investment. Id. at ch. VI, art.
42.
See Vietnam Trade Network, Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam
<http://www.vitranet.com.vn/fdi/luat/htmUanh/1002_169.htm> (accessed Apr. 13,
2001).
37. See Id. at ch. I, art. I; Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 325 n. I; Vern Weitzel, Canst. of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, art. 26 <http://coombs.anu.edu.au/-vern/van_kien/
constit.html> (accessed Apr. 12, 2001).
38. See generally Douglas Jehl, Clinton Drops I9-Year Ban on U.S. Trade with
Vietnam; Cites Hanoi's Help on M.f.A.'s, N.Y. Times AI (Feb. 4, 1994).
39. H.R. Asia & P. Subcomm., Inti. Econ. Policy & Trade Subcomm. of the Inti.
Rei. Comm., U.S.-Vietnam Trade Relations, 106th Cong. ~ 3 (Sept. 19, 2000)
(statement of Representative Doug Bereuter, Co-Chair).
40. See Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Agreement Between the United States ofAmerica and
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations ch. 6, arts. 1-8
<http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/text.html> (accessed Apr. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Agreement].
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global economy, and export promotion as the key to economic
development. 41

III.

ECONOMIC REFORM, ECONOMIC LEGISLATION, AND THE BRIDGE
BACK TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: "CAPITAL, CAPITAL, AND

MORE CAPITAL"

As Mr. Do Muoi, Vietnam's then-Party Secretary, declared in
1996, the Party's new "slogan must be capital, capital, and more
capital."42 Given the transnational mobility of goods, capital, and
technology, economics is now essentially international. The preamble
to the bilateral U.S.-Vietnam trade accord states that Vietnam "is
taking steps to integrate into the regional and world economy by ...
joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum (APEC) .... "43 Vietnam is currently presiding for
the first time over ASEAN, an irony President Clinton noted during an
economic summit meeting in Brunei, as Vietnam "is heading an
organization that was invented to contain it." 44
Like China's path of reform, the Vietnamese path is defined by
the retention of the state's dominant role in the state sector and the
creation of a parallel non-state sector consisting of private and foreigninvested enterprises. 45 In 1986, the Sixth Communist Party Congress,
launching doi moi, issued an order to modify the command economy
by permitting the institution of private and foreign-invested sectors. 46
In 1991, the Seventh Communist Party Congress extended doi moi to
legal reform. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet announced that, "there must
be a complete change from bureaucratic management to running the

41. See Brown, supra n. 30.
42. Jeremy Grant, Vietnam Party Chief Urges Debt Repayment, Fin. Times
(London) 3 (Jan. 15, 1996).
43. See Agreement, supra n. 40.
44. David E. Sanger, Clinton In Hanoi, Intent on Forging New Relationship, N.Y.
Times AI (Nov. 17, 2000) (quoting President Clinton).
45. See generally Justin Yigu Lin, Why Has China 's Economic Reform Been
Successful? <http://www.franserinstitute.ca/montpelerin/papers/china_success/> (accessed Apr. 4, 2001) (discussing China's economic reform).
46. See Luke Aloysius McGrath, Vietnam's Struggle to Balance Sovereignty,
Centralization, and Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 Fordham Inti. L.J. 2095,
2095-96 (1995).
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nation by law."47 The Constitution was revised in 1992 to reflect the
state's new priority-to "promote a multi-component commodity
economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the
management of the State and following a socialist orientation."48
A market economy, in other words, is now permitted, as long as it
does not unduly disrupt the government's preferences of a "socialist
orientation." A private sector economy, under the 1992 Constitution,
would be permitted, as long as it remains "under the management of
the State" and does not threaten state ownership and the one-party
apparatus. According to the 1992 Constitution, the Party remains the
"force leading the State and society" and "the vanguard of the
Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and
interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation,
acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's
thought .... "49 Indeed, in a prompt statement issued in response to
President Clinton's speech in Vietnam in November 2000 advocating a
"more open, sophisticated free market, based on international rules of
law," 50 Mr. Le Kha Phieu, the Party's General Secretary, warned:
"Our economy has many sectors, in which the state sector plays the
leading role. We have a private economy but we do not privatize the
economy." 51
Like Deng Xiao Ping's slogan exclaiming that "[t]o get rich is
glorious" in China, "capital, capital, and more capital," the Vietnamese
government hoped, would come from the private sector, which
includes the domestic private sector and the heavily promoted foreigninvested sector. Reflecting the policy of encouraging a private sector,
the Law on Companies, for example, allows Vietnamese individuals to
form private limited liability and shareholding companies. 52 The Law
on Private Enterprises permits Vietnamese individuals to establish their

47. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 99 (citation omitted).
48. Vern Weitzel, Const. of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, art. 15
<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/-vern/van_ kien/constit.html> (accessed Apr. 12, 200 I).
49. Jd. at art. 4.
50. Seth Mydans, Clinton Basks in the Adulation of a City Once Called Saigon,
N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 20, 2000) (quoting President Clinton).
51. Jd. (quoting Le Kha Phieu).
52. See Pham Van Thuyet, Legal Framework and Private Sector Development in
Transitional Economies: The Case of Viet-nam, 27 L. & Policy Inti. Bus. 541, 563-67
(Spring 1996).
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own private enterprises, 53 defined as "a business unit which has a level
of capital no less than that of its legal capital, which is owned b~ an
individual who shall ... be responsible for its business activities." 4
Similarly, reflecting the policy of promoting a foreign-invested
sector, the government has passed a litany of laws to support both
foreign investment and commercial transactions. The Law on Foreign
Investment (LFI), passed in 1987, 55 was touted as "one of the most
liberal foreign investment codes of any developing nation in the world,
let alone Southeast Asia." 56 The 1987 LFI, for example, provides for a
duration period of twenty years for foreign-invested enterprises, which
may be extended. 57 The LFI also assures investors that the invested
capital and assets of foreign enterprises and private persons shall not be
expropriated by administrative procedure, and that the enterprises shall
not be nationalized. 58 It also allows foreign investors to set up wholly
owned foreign enterprises, 59 rather than requiring foreign investors to
do business through the joint venture form, whereby foreign investors
may be relegated by law to minority equity ownership. Investors are
also allowed to repatriate capital and profits freely. 60
Effective July 1, 2000, the National Assembly amended the LFI
to further liberalize the country's foreign investment regime. 61 "The
53. See Batin, Ltd., Law on Private Enterprises in Vietnam ch. l, art. l (amended
June 22, 1994) <http://www.batin.com.vn/vninfo/docs/t339.htm> (accessed Apr. 13,
2001).
54. ld. at ch. l, art. 2.
55. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra n. 36.
56. Thomas R. Stauch, Student Author, The United States and Vietnam:
Overcoming the Past and Investing in the Future, 28 Inti. Law. 995, I 0 ll ( 1994).
57. Law on Foreign Investment, supra n. 36, at ch. II, art. 15.
58. Id. at ch. III, art. 21 (amended Dec. 23, 1992). The 1992 amendment to the Law
on Foreign Investment emphasizes Vietnam's commitment to adequate compensation
in case of expropriation. /d. Art. 23 of Vietnam's Constitution retains for the
government the right to expropriate property upon payment of appropriate
compensation in a freely convertible currency. Weitzel, supra n. 48, at art. 23.
59. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 36, at ch. II, art. 4(3) (forms of
investment allowed consist of"[e]nterprise with one hundred (100) [percent] foreign
owned capital.") /d.
60. Jd. at ch. III, art. 22. The fact that the local currency, the dong, is not
convertible makes repatriation a problem, but that has to do with convertibility, not
with restrictions imposed by the Law on Foreign Investment.
61. Natl. Assembly Vietnam L. No. 18/2000/QHIO, 10-7 Legis. (June 9, 2000)
(available at <http://ivietnam.com/Eng!BUSINESSILAWS/Investment/investmentlaw/
lawl8.asp> (accessed Apr. 13, 2001)) (amendments & additions to Law on Foreign
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unanimous voting principle in joint venture enterprises," previously
required for certain joint venture actions, "was removed [with] respect
[to] the appointment and dismissal of the Chief Accountant [and]
approval of ... [certain] loan arrangements." 62 The amended LFI
contains other provisions generally favored by foreign investors,
including: ( 1) a new article allowing a foreign-invested enterprise to
purchase foreign currency from banks to meet its current transactional
needs; 63 (2) a provision reducing profits remittance tax rates to a low of
three percent, five percent, and seven percent from the ~revious five
percent, seven percent, and ten percent respectively; 4 and (3) a
provision allowing investors to mortfage land use rights as security for
loans from local and foreign banks. 6
By all indications, Vietnam is assuredly on the path toward
integrating with the global economy and reducing barriers to trade. It
has announced its intention to join the World Trade Organization and
"plans to sweeten its bid ... by offeri~ initial market access in goods
during the next round of entry talks." 6 According to estimates by the
United Nations, Vietnam has attracted almost $11 billion in foreign
direct investment in the last five years. 67 The government has signed
bilateral trade agreements with fifty-seven countries and territories, and
has reached agreement on exchanging most favored nation status with
seventy-two countries and territories. 68 The U.S.-Vietnam bilateral
Investment in Vietnam).
62. Landmark Year for Vietnam, Asia Today (Oct. 2000) (available in Lexis, News
library). In order to attract the maximum amount of foreign capital, Vietnam's law
does not impose a ceiling on foreign equity ownership in joint ventures, which means
that the majority equity partner, foreign or domestic, would be granted greater control
via board representation. In order to ensure that the minority equity partner would not
lose control, the LFI imposes a unanimous voting principle on certain actions, so that
the minority's affirmative vote is necessary because the joint venture can take certain
actions. The unanimity rule, combined with the absence of a foreign equity ceiling,
generally mean that foreign capital can be attracted without the fear oflosing control to
foreign investors. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art. 14 § 1,
art. 21.
63. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art 33
64. Compare Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 36, at art. 43 with
Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art. 43.
65. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art. 46(3).
66. John Zarocostas, Vietnam Pushing to Advance Its WTO Entry Bid, U. Press Inti.
(Oct. 13, 2000) (available in Lexis, News library).
67. !d.
68. !d.
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accord 69 gives Vietnam Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status. It is
comprehensive, with six chapters covering goods, including
agricultural goods, intellectual <Property, services, investment, business
facilitation, and transparency. 7 The trade accord will expand the type
of products that Vietnam could export to the United States at the low
NTR tariffrate. 71 The World Bank estimates that Vietnam's exports in
the first year of NTR could double the 1999 levels and rise to $1.3
billion. 72
In return for access to the U.S. market, Vietnam must open up its
market to U.S. products and services. 73 For example, Vietnam must
reduce, by a third to a half, tariffs across a wide range of high-tech,
agricultural, and industrial goods. 74 It will also eliminate non-tariff
barriers such as quotas, discretionary import licensing, and guarantee
trading rights for Americans and Vietnamese over a phased-in period. 75
Vietnam will adopt WTO standards for protection of intellectual
property within one year for patents and trademarks and within
eighteen months for copyrights and trade secrets. 76 Services will also
be liberalized, providing an opportunity for American firms to compete
in the growing telecommunications sector, 77 Internet services, 78
banking, insurance, financial services, and professional services such
as legal, architectural and engineering. 79 In the investment field,
69. See Agreement, supra n. 40.
70. !d. at chs. I-VI.
71. !d. at ch. I.
72. See generally Brown, supra n. 30.
73. See Agreement, supra n. 40 at ch. I, III.
74. !d. at ch. I, annex E.
75. ld. at ch. I, art. 3.
76. ld. at ch. II, art 18.
77. !d. at ch. II, annex F. The Vietnamese government is ambivalent about whether
to open up the telecommunications industry, a necessary step if the country is to be
technologically connected to the rest of the world, yet also a risky undertaking given
the government's determination to retain monopoly power. According to the
representative in Vietnam for Nokia of Finland, the mobile phone manufacturer, only
seven tenths of one percent of Vietnamese have cell phones, and 72 percent ofthese are
in Saigon. See Mydans, supra n. 50.
78. See Mydans, supra n. 50. According to Gene Sperling, the White House
economic policy adviser in the Clinton Administration, commenting on Internet use in
Vietnam, "one-tenth of [one] percent are on the Internet; by 2005, the projection is still
that there will be less than [one] percent." !d. An hour on the Internet costs the user
three dollars, in a country where the per capita income is six dollars a week. ld.
79. See Agreement, supra n. 40, at ch. III, annex F.
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Vietnam's commitments include the elimination of local content and
export performance requirements. 80 Under the trade agreement,
Vietnam is also required to commit to a process of transparency81 by
reforming its administrative policies. As discussed in Part IV, this
commitment is perhaps the single most important step toward a legal
reform process necessary to effectuate its economic doi moi policy.
The promotion of a private and foreign-investment sector is also
accompanied by efforts to reform the state sector by a process the
government calls "equitization,"82 in a deliberate attempt to avoid the
more ideologically provocative term "privatization." Since 1993,
Vietnam has allowed state-owned enterprises to be transformed into
shareho1ding companies. 83 Up until 1998, about thirty companies had
in fact sold their shares, mainly to employees. 84 In 1999, Vietnam
granted three companies permission to sell up to thirty percent of their
shares to foreign investors, thereby allowing those investors to
participate directly in the equitization process, and as many hope,
raising share quality and improving transparency. 85 In July 2000, a
securities exchange was established, with four privatized state-owned
companies licensed to list on the exchange. 86 However, like China's
80. !d. at ch. IV.
81. !d. at ch. IV, art. 5.
82. Pham Nguyen Xuan Bac, Equitisation Buzzword Fails to Grab Headlines,
Vietnam Inv. Rev. (June 12, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 9575744). Note that state
sector equitization fits into Vietnam's policy of encouraging foreign investment, in this
case, investment in Vietnamese stocks. !d.
83. See Frederik Balfour, Vietnam Approves Three Companies to Sell Shares to
Foreigners, Agence France-Presse Inti. News (Jan. 14, 1999) (available in Lexis, News
library); Vietnam Earmarks 390 Firms for Privatization this Year, Agence FrancePresse Fin. Pages (May 8, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 2788986); Bac, supra n. 82
(explaining that although only five state enterprises were equitized by 1996, 370 had
been equitized by the end of 1999).
84. Balfour, supra n. 83; Minh Quang, Stock Trading Only Be Boosted By More
Share Issues: Business, Saigon Times Daily (Sept. 18, 2000) (available in 2000 WL
24467798). "Equitized companies have asserted the need to issue new shares to boost
the stock market and avoid negative sentimental impact, instead of relying on already
issued shares, which are mostly held by company employees and the State." !d. The
large numbers of shares currently held by company employees and the government has
also created a liquidity problem. !d.
85. Balfour, supra n. 83; see Vietnam Exchange Tied Up in Red Tape: Investors
Stay Home, Natl. Post DOl (July 20, 2000) (available in Lexis, News library)
[hereinafter Red Tape].
86. See Red Tape, supra n. 85; Establishing St. Stock Comm., Nov. 28, 1996,
Decree No. 75-CP, art. 1 Vietnam Off. Gaz. (Jan. 31, 1997); Michael Mathes, Are
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"privatization" of the state sector, 87 Vietnam's state sector reform is
designed primarily to coax domestic capital accumulated in the private
sector into state enterprises where the government acts as controlling
shareholder. This strategy allows the government to accomplish two
goals. First, it can bring private capital under government control,
hence diffusing a possible threat to its power. Second, it can use
private capital to raise funds for the ailing state sector. 88 Indeed,
private sector growth has allowed the local population to accumulate
savings estimated at $10 billion or more in gold or hard currency,
hidden and not deposited in banks because of a general distrust of
formal banking channels. 89 Consequently, the government views the
institution of shareholding and a securities market as a means throu~h
which the state can channel private capital into its state enterprises. 0
Indeed, the government views economic reform, even state sector
equitization, as a vehicle to further socialism, or as Deputy Premier
Phan Van Khai put it, "the most important guarantee for socialist
orientation. " 91
Equitization of the state sector in Vietnam, then, is being
conducted for the ideological purpose of furthering "market socialism."
This has led the government to adopt a number of problematic policies.
First, the state is less concerned that the stock market serves as a
vehicle for the most economically promising company to raise capital,
Investors Giddy About Vietnam Again?, Deutsche Presse-Agentur Fin. Pages (July 21,
2000) (available in Lexis, News library); Profits Hard to Come by For Vietnam Stock
Brokers, Deutsche Presse-Agentur Fin. Pages (Oct. 31, 2000) (available in Lexis, News
library).
87. See generally Lan Cao, Public Perspectives on Privatization: Chinese
PriVatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 L. & Contemporary Problems 13 (2000)
(discussing China's privitazation policy).
88. See Fuminori Murata, Little Stock in Exchange in Vietnam: Observers Doubt
Market Will Open Before End of Century, Nikkei Wkly. 17 (Feb. 10, 1997) (discussing
the government's objective of enc~uraging the local population to invest because
growth in the private sector has allowed many to hoard savings).
89. /d.
90. See Nick J. Freeman, On Course for a Bourse, Bus. Times (Singapore) 13 (Aug.
29, 1998) (available in 1998 WL 27111339).
91. Cindy Nguyen, The Vietnamese Stock Market: Viability in Southeast Asia and
Appeal Around the World, 21 Loy. L.A. Inti. & Comp. L.J. 607, 610 (Aug. 1999)
(quoting Phan Van Khai); Bus. Vietnam Staff, Hanoi Refuses to Let Go, Bus. Vietnam
(June I, 1996) (available in 1996 WL 11680301) ("While the 8th Congress is unlikely
to return Vietnam to a command economy, it will reassert the importance of the state
sector ....").
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but is rather more concerned that it serves the purpose of raising capital
for state enterprises. Thus, shares traded on the securities exchange are
expected to be those from state-owned enterprises, 92 not private firms,
even though private companies, which are the country's engine of
growth, are in great need of capital. The government is also the chief
beneficiary of the securities market-on the first day of the exchange's
opening, the povernment offered $22 million dollars of its own bonds
for trading. 9 Second, Vietnam, like China until the beginning of
2000, 94 has a quota system in which the government, not the market,
establishes quotas for the relevant ministries and provincial authorities,
who then decide how many state enterprises in their jurisdiction are
allowed to equitize. 95 Third, and finally, the large number of shares
held by company employees and retained by the state due to
ideological considerations has resulted in illiquidity in the market. 9?
For example, trading in one of the listed companies, Transimex, had to
be suspended because insufficient shares had been made available. 97
The company's employees had apparently agreed not to sell shares to
outsiders. As a result, according to an official with the state-owned
Enterprise Reform Board, "[b]uy orders were plentiful while holders of
shares were not ready to yield up any of theirs, most of them company
employees." 98
The government's current equitization efforts, like its other
policies aimed at international economic liberalization, are marred by
the state's pursuit of "market socialism," as market-based allocation
and individual preferences are permitted, but only to the extent that
they do not threaten socialism's foundation. Indeed, while the United
States insists that it is through an expansion of commercial ties that
even hard-line Communist governments can be pulled into alignment
with the West, Vietnam insists on the reverse-that market reforms
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Profits Hard to Come by for Vietnam Stock Brokers, supra n. 86.
See Red Tape, supra n. 85.
See Cao, supra n. 87.
See Viet D. Dinh, Financial Reform and Economic Development in Vietnam, 28
L. & Policy Inti. Bus. 857, 885 (Spring 1997); Stock Market Struggles to Take Off,
Bus. Vietnam (Oct. 1, 1996) (available in 1996 WL 11680367).
96. See Quang, supra n. 84.
97. ld.
98. !d. (quoting Nguyen Thieng Due). In one company, the state held a thirty
percent stake, while the employees held a fifty-five percent stake. In another, the ratio
was forty-five percent to twenty percent, respectively. !d.
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could only be palatable if they do not damage socialism. Vietnam's
top Party leader, Le Kha Phieu, warned that the battle with the West
has moved from the battlefield to other arenas. According to Mr.
Phieu, "They continue to seek ways to completely wipe out the
remaining socialist countries and attack the movements for
independence, democracy and social progress. We should never relax
our vigilance for a minute." 99
IV. RULE OF LAW AND RULE BY LAW

A. VIETNAM'S LEGISLATION FACTORY
Doi moi was supposed to unleash a burst of energy from within,
as capital poured in from foreign investors. After the United States
lifted the embargo, more than 400 U.S. firms joined European and
Asian companies already doing business in Vietnam. 100 "By 1996
. foreign direct investment ... reached [$]8.3 billion" and accounted
"for more than a third of Vietnam's GDP." 101 Over the past three
years, however, foreign firms have retreated, with foreign direct
investment falling below the 1992 level. 102 Many factors have been
cited to explain the apparent failure of the country to fulfill early
. expectations that it would be the next "Asian Tiger": Asia's financial
crisis of 1997; a non-convertible currency; a rudimentary financial
system; a see-saw attitude exhibited by some factions of the Party
toward foreign investment; and the Party's waging of a "social evils"
campaign in 1996.
But one of the keys, if not the key, to the problem that Vietnam
faces as it engages in the process of reform is its legal system. Then
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, speaking at the 1993 National Juridical
Conference in Hanoi, acknowledged the country's need to pursue legal
renovation as well as economic renovation. "We lack many laws. In
the economic field, which is a priority in legislation, a legal framework
still has to be worked out." 103 Yet, as discussed above, Vietnam has in

99. See Sanger, supra n. 44 (quoting Le Kha Phieu).
100. F.T. McCarthy, Goodnight Vietnam: Foreign Direct Investment: Vietnam Was
Meant to Be the Next Asian Phenomenon, But this Tiger Never Roared, Economist
(Jan. 8, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 8140317) [hereinafter Goodnight Vietnam].
101. /d.
102. /d.
103. Rose, supra n. 12, at 105.
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fact filled the void by passing many laws. It is also true that there has
been a "quiet resurgence of legal discourse" 104 in Vietnam, with law
faculties reopening and institutions of legal education established. 105 It
is also true that the Seventh Communist Party Congress expanded doi
moi's economic policy initiated by the Sixth Communist Party
Congress to include legal reform. The Central Committee of the Party
called on the National Legislature to "improve the skills of lawmakers
in promulgating and organizing the implementation of law." 106
According to Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, "there must be a complete
chan~e from bureaucratic management to running the nation by
law." 07 The Constitution, accordingly, states that "[a]ll Party
organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution and the
Law."l08
Yet the "rule of law"-the institution of law that subjects the
government as well as the people to its rule in a transparent, impartial,
and predictable manner-is far from a reality in the country. "[L]egal
education in Vietnam remains tethered to abstract socialist political
principles, under which law is considered to be a purely political tool to
shape the people and to build a new society." 109
The Vietnamese government has passed "hundreds of new laws
and ordinances-running up to 20,000 pages in the last decade .... " 110
Indeed, "[t]he government has become a virtual legislation factory with
new laws, decrees, circulars, directives and regulations, often in draft

104. Mark Side!, The Re-Emergence of Legal Discourse in Vietnam, 43 Inti. &
Comp. L.Q. 163, 163 (1994).
105. /d. at 165; See Rose, supra n. 12, at 101 n. 21. Similarly, law school enrollment
has increased, with courses ranging from traditional legal subjects such as
constitutional law, administrative law, civil and criminal procedures, "Law and State,"
and courses on Marxism/Leninism. ld.
106. Rose, supra n. 12, at 99.
107. Jd.
108. Weitzel, supra n. 48 at ch. 1, art. 4.
109. Rose, supra n. 12, at 101.
110. /d. at 100. A slew of laws have been adopted, such as: "a Criminal Code
(1986), a Criminal Procedure Code (1989), a Law of Trade Unions (1989), a Press Law
(1989), Taxes on Natural Resources, High Income and Housing (199'0), Law on
Religion (1991), Laws of National Assembly Organization and Elections (1992),
Foreign Investment Law (1987), Bankruptcy Law (1994), and an Environmental
Protection Law (1994)." Jd. at 101, n. 19. In an attempt to shift from rule by the Party
to ostensibly the "rule of law," the government enacted an 834-article Civil Code in
1995 that covers comprehensively the various aspects of Vietnamese life. Jd. at 101.
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form, coming out almost weekly." 111 While the shift from a system
based on rule by Party decree to one based on the "rule of law" is
significant, legal reform requires more than passing laws. The deluge
of new laws has resulted in increased bureaucratization whereby
overlapping ministries and agencies issue contradictory laws,
ordinances, decrees, and circulars, leading to inconsistent application
of the law and the fostering of "an uncertain climate." 112 In addition,
local People's Councils often issue decrees that vary from national
laws. 113 It has thus been widely reported that "[l]aws and regulations
are often poorly drafted and ambiguous, and are apt to be construed
differently by various government bodies." 114 The more official
published laws are surrounded· by a morass of decrees, unpublished
"drawer regulations," and freewheeling local regulations, the greater
the chances are for "flexibility" and corruption.
As noted,
"[c]orruption is a way of life in Vietnam, and requests for payments are
often made bl various . . . officials . . . at different levels of
government." 11 Furthermore, the absence of a mechanism to provide
the public with legal information has only added to the confusion. To
ensure adequate dissemination of information among governmental
agencies, official laws are supposed to be published in the Office of the

111. Jonathan L. Golin, Tiger by the Tail, 81 ABA J. 62, 64 (Feb. 1995).
112. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 102.
[T]he local administrative agency is subject to the "horizontal" subordination
of the People's Committee at the same level and the "vertical" subordination
to the relevant ministry (or the agency of ministerial rank) in professional
matters. Local administration seems to be a decentralized system but the
principle of double subordination reintroduces a certain kind of
centralization . . . . However, this does not mean that the Government has
hierarchical power over the organs on a lower level. The power of the
Government over the lower levels is "indirect."

!d. (citation omitted).
113. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 102-03; McGrath, supra n. 46, at 2121-22 (for a
discussion of the tension between the local or provincial level and the national
government).
114. Mathilde L. Genovese, What Every Investor Needs to Know About Doing
Business in Vietnam Practical Guidelines and Tips, 18 E. Asian Exec. Reps. 9, 24
(Aug. 15, 1996).
115. !d.
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Government Gazette; yet, its circulation of 3,000 copies is far below
the 20,000 to 30,000 required. 116
Ever-changing rules and unpublished and non-uniform rules have
not created a system based on the "rule oflaw." Rather, the reverse has
occurred, impeding the development of a comprehensive and consistent
framework of law and leaving investors more vulnerable to abuse and
corruption by local officials. As aptly put by The Economist:
Every investor has a different horror story. The paper that 3M
imports to make Post-It Notes faces an arbitrarily high tariff as
"office products" (40% duty) rather than "adhesive-backed paper"
(10%). This makes it more expensive than the same Post-It Notes
smugglers bring in from Thailand .... A Taiwanese investor was
so frustrated by corrupt customs officials who failed to do what
they had been bribed to do that it tried to sue one of them for
117
breach of contract.

B. THE RULE OF LAW FOR A MARKET ECONOMY

Referring to Vietnam's eclectic legal traditions, a commentator
has noted that Vietnam's legal system "is a hodgepodge of remnants of
the French civil law system, pre-doi moi socialist decrees, and the
recent proliferation of commercially oriented regulations lifted
wholesale from market economies." 118 Certainly legal reform has been
made more complicated by this confusion.
As has been discussed elsewhere, 119 Vietnam has historically
been influenced by Chinese traditions with an emphasis on a "rule of
moral" rather than the "rule of law." 120 "There is a tendency in
Vietnam, as in China historically, to rely on 'morality, custom, kinship
or politics, rather than formal legality. "' 121 Village tradition, rituals,
116. Rose, supra n. 12, at 103 n. 28.
117. See Goodnight Vietnam, supra n. 100.
118. Golin, supra n. Ill, at 63.
119. Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 325-26; Gillespie, supra n. 22, at 555.
120. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 96. This is not to say that rule of moral systems had
no law generally or no contract law specifically. Recent works on China, for example,
show that the Chinese had some system of contract law even in the earlier periods.
Jonathan D. Spence, The Death of Woman Wang 71-72 (Viking Press 1978); Hugh T.
Scogin, Jr., Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in Han Dynasty China,
63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1325, 1376 (1990).
121. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 96 (citation omitted).
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and familial status constituted a form of"unofficiallaw" coexisting and
sometimes challenging the "official law" of the imperial
bureaucracy. 122 Imperial law was vertical law between the sovereign
and the individual and did not concern matters that involved horizontal
rights between one individual and another. 123 As a result, "private
commercial relationships remained creatures of customary practice ....
Trade was apparently organized along a network of interlocking
obligations. Relationships depended upon the observance of patronage
obligations, such as son to father, family to clan, and clan to
village." 124 Community trust formed the basis of trade among clan or
village members, and the guidance and mediation of "men of virtuous
character" were relied upon to resolve disputes. 125 Local institutions
were "states within a state"-hence, the apt proverb, "the laws of the
emperor give way to the customs of the village." 126
Imported into this system was a French colonial civil law system
of rights-based law that governed French citizens and other
Europeans. 127 A small number of Vietnamese bureaucrats, judicial
officers, law~ers, and merchants also were exposed to and learned
French law. 1 8 In the North, following independence from the French,
a centralized leffl system reflecting a Soviet-style planned economy
was instituted. 9 Land was brought under state or collective
ownership by the Vietnamese Workers Party, which succeeded in
disrupting the traditional "tradin~ culture that had survived both
Chinese and French annexation." 1 0 Given the Marxist view that the
"rule of law" is a form of legal fetishism, it is not surprising that the
Party's hostility to legalism was extended to the South at the end of the
war. 131 Since the implementation of doi moi, the government has
embarked on the process of legal reform.
These efforts, however, as suggested above, have merely resulted
in legislation overload and confusion. It would appear that, with its
See Gillespie, supra n.
See Gillespie, supra n.
!d.
!d. at 328-29.
See Gillespie, supra n.
See Gillespie, supra n.
!d.
!d.
130. !d. at 331.
131. !d. at 332-33.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

22, at 559.
23, at 327-28.

22, at 560.
23, at 329.
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nee-Confucian system and a Soviet legacy of immense distrust of law,
Vietnam's legal system does not have the type of rules that meet
international standards necessary to support a modem market economy.
In other words, it does not have what law and development advisers
generally term the "rule oflaw." 132
The "rule of law," as many commentators have observed, should
achieve the following purposes: to protect against Hobbesian anarchy;
to "allow people to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that
they can know in advance the legal consequences of various actions";
and to guarantee against official arbitrariness. 133 Vietnam's legal
reform, even in the limited area of market institutions and commercial
relationships, has failed to live up to those standards.
For a country that is establishing a market economy aimed at
global integration, Vietnam's laws are still more suitable for a society
organized along traditional, pre-modem lines. As sociologists have
noted, there has been a historical evolution from "community" to
"society." 134 The former is characterized by groups bound by kinship,
ethnic, or religious ties, or ties based on other affinities. The latter is
characterized by persons who interact more on an arm's length basis
than on a relational basis, so that their ties are looser than those forged
in a community context. The transformation from community to
spciety has generally accompanied the evolution from feudalism to

132. See Fallon, supra n. 9, at 6-7. Fallon has identified four "ideal-typical
conceptions" of the "rule of law"-historicist, formalist, Legal Process and
substantive-to come up with his thesis that the "rule of law" is "best conceived as
comprising multiple strands, including values and considerations to which each of the
four competing ideal types calls attention." /d. at 5-6.
133. See id. at 7-8. Against the context of these background purposes are the five
elements of the "rule of law" that Richard Fallon identified: (I) legal rules must be
comprehensible so that people can understand the law and comply with it; (2) the law
should be able to guide people in the conduct of their affairs; (3) it should be stable; (4)
it should constitute a supreme source of authority whose scope should include officials
as well as ordinary citizens; (5) it should be impartial and courts should be available to
enforce it. /d. at 8-9. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-39 (Yale U. Press
1964) (specifying eight criteria for law to exist: generality, publicity, prospectivity,
clarity, noncontradictoriness, capability of being followed, stability, and congruence
between norms as stated and as applied).
134. See generally Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (Basic Books, Inc.
1966); Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft
(Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans., Mich. St. U. Press 1957).
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modernism, from exchanges based on relations and "natural will" to
exchanges based on contract and "rational wi11." 135
"The reciprocal ties of social obligation among members of a
community defined standards of behavior" 136 when community was
central in members' lives. The shift away from the primacy of
"community" toward "society" has meant a shift from exchanges based
on community ties to exchanges based on freedom of contract"a world of independent actors, each of whom should be allowed to
pursue his or her own interests without regard for the interests of
others," absent fraud and public policy considerations. 137
Again, a word of caution is in order. The status/contract,
community/society distinctions should not be overstated to characterize
traditional communities as inert and frozen in time, their inhabitants
trapped by status, while Western societies are viewed as progressive
and active, with inhabitants freely defining themselves through contract
rather than inherited status. There are aspects of both status and
contract in different legal systems, and as some sociologists have
remarked on the overly blunt categorization of status versus contract,
collective versus individual distinction, "collectivity and individuality
in legal matters are aspects of all systems, not alternative systems ....
The generalizations couched in these terms use one aspect of a system
to characterize the whole, which is a procedure of dubious worth." 138
That said, in today's international economic system, commercial
laws, such as modem contract law, are necessary to facilitate open
market transactions. Such laws allow for the enforcement of individual
exchanges, taking into consideration the parties' expectations and
allowing for the imposition of damages in case of breach. The
enforcement of such exchanges is essential to develop an open market
economy (as opposed to an economy based on close familistic or
community ties where enforcement depends on trust and ostracism)
and is premised on the assumption that an open market furthers
135. See generally Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law 99-100 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
1917); Tonnies, supra n. 134; Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society
(W.D. Halls trans., Macmillan 1984).
136. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829,
831 (1983).
137. See id. at 839.
138. Sally F. Moore, Legal Liability and Evolutionary Interpretation: Some Aspects
of Strict Liability, Self-help and Collective Responsibility, in The Allocation of
Responsibility 51, 100-01 (Max Gluckman ed., Manchester U. Press 1972).

2001)

REFLECTIONS ON MARKET REFORM IN VIETNAM

1055

individual freedom of action and constitutes the most efficient means
of allocating resources and maximizing wealth for individuals and
society. 139
· Simply put, absent public policy and fraud considerations, market
economies generally do not question individual preferences, allowing
allocations by the market rather than substituting them with
government preferences or commands from the central plan. The legal
system facilitates private choices made in the market-thus it is crucial
in developing a market economy. Where voluntary exchanges are
made on an arm's length basis between strangers, as they generally are
in a modem market economy, they must be made with the general
understanding that contracts will be enforceable and binding on the
parties absent some overriding public policy consideration. If Vietnam
is to transform its economy from one that is defined by community
norms of the village and the clan to an economy that is defined by nonrelational, arm's length norms, then the development of a "rule of law"
to enforce arms' length exchanges is all the more urgent.
Without asserting a causal link between economic growth and a
market-based economy (although there is increasing evidence that there
is some link between the two), I note merely that Vietnam has made the
decision to embark on doi moi based on its own assessment that a
market is necessary to increase efficiency, maximize wealth, and
promote economic growth-this despite the fear that attracting global
capital to the domestic market might very well lead to the inevitable
dfminution of the Party's own power. Yet, the exercise of individual
choices in a market economy is only meaningful if such exercise is free
from arbitrary government interference and enforceable bylaws that are
impartial, transparent, and predictable. Take the simple example of a
contract between a foreign company and a domestic state enterprise. If
the rule of modem contract law were to be established, it should be
obvious that even governmental actors would be held subject to the
"rule of law." Could investors be certain that a Vietnamese court
would apply the law and issue a judgment against a state enterprise or
that a Vietnamese court would enforce a foreign arbitral award that had
been granted in the investor's favor against a state-owned company?
Could investors be certain that the law would not be replaced by a
series of laws or decrees seeking to interpret and reinterpret the first
139. See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,
8 J. Leg. Stud. 103, 132 (1979).
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law? These are elementary and obvious questions, yet the answers are
neither obvious nor certain in Vietnam.

V.

CONCLUSION

Twenty years ago, Vietnam had been virulently anti-capital, antimarket. In the immediate postwar years, it adopted two general
policies in its economic development objectives: first, to rely not on the
market but on the government, through a central plan, to override
individual preferences and implement developmental objectives that
reflect state preferences; and second, to insulate the national economy
from the international economic system in order to break what it
considered to be the neo-colonial, dependent relationship that has
defined First and Third World countries. 140 The Party ruled by
administrative decree to ensure the institution of those objectives. 141
Twenty years later, it is noteworthy that the U.S.-Vietnam
bilateral trade agreement-the legal document that governs trade
between the two countries-contains a separate chapter detailing the
precise steps Vietnam must undertake to establish the rules of law over
matters applicable to the agreement. 142
The chapter entitled,
"Transparency-Related Provisions and the Right to Appeal," is
designed to ensure, through provisions dealing with public notice, that
fundamentals such as the right to comment, the dissemination and
publication of applicable laws, the right to a hearing, the right to
judicial review, and the basic principles underlying a "rule of law"transparency,
predictability,
and
impartiality-would
be
implemented. 143
Article 1 requires each nation to "publish on a regular and prompt
basis all laws, regulations and administrative procedures of general
application pertaining to any matter covered by this Agreement" 144 so
as to allow those interested to become acquainted with them before
they come into effect. Article 3 requires each nation to allow "the
other . . . and its nationals the opportunity to comment on the
formulation of laws, regulations and administrative procedures of

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See generally Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 330-33.
/d.
See Agreement, supra n. 40, at ch. 6, arts. 1-8.
!d.
!d. at ch. 6, art. l.
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general application that may affect the conduct of business
145
activities .... "
Article 5 requires that all relevant measures be
published in official journals on a regular basis. 146 Article 6 requires
the respective governments to administer their laws, regulations, and
administrative frocedures "in a uniform, impartial and reasonable
manner .... " 14
Finally, Article 7 mandates the maintenance of
"administrative and judicial tribunals and procedures for the
purpose ... of the prompt review and correction ... of administrative
action relating to matters covered by this Agreement." 148 It also
provides for the "right of appeal," and if the right to appeal is initially
to an administrative body, "there shall also be the opportunity for
appeal ofthe decision to a judicial body." 149
In 1995, President Clinton dispatched then Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, to Vietnam to establish the groundwork for a post~
embargo relationship. 150 Mr. Christopher warned that embarking on
economic reform was similar to undertaking "a passage over a
ravine." 151
The passage is bound to be intricate, arduous, and complicated.
Pendulum swings between the hardliners opposed to, and reformers
favoring, international economic integration, are bound to occur and
recur in the coming years. But on a pragmatic level, if the government
wishes to create an economy where its people will be making more
than one dollar a day, it will have to work with, not against, the forces
of global economic integration, to promote economic engagement, not
segregation. In spite of political constraints, Saigon, for example, has
built a robust private sector whose ten percent growth rate, according to
its mayor, has created jobs and brought the city's poverty level
down. 152 It might tum out, indeed, that twenty-five years after the end.
of the war, it is the South that will be in the position to liberate the
North.

145. ld. at ch, 6, art. 3.
146. /d.atch.6,art. 5.
147. ld. at ch. 6, art. 6.
148. Id. at ch. 6, art. 7.
149. ld.
150. See Sanger, supra n. 44.
151. /d.
152. Jd.

